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Issue No. 011 · Architecture

Most-favored-nation clauses, explained.

Every MFN clause creates a notice process. Most funds still have to assemble it by hand.

By Owen E. H. Meyer · August 9, 2025 · 7 min read

A most-favored-nation clause sounds simple until someone has to administer it. It does not grant better terms automatically — it creates a notice-and-election process the fund has to administer correctly.

What the clause obligates the fund to do

An MFN right obligates the fund to notify every LP holding that right whenever a new side letter grants better terms on a covered provision, so each of them can decide whether to elect it too. Fund documents typically require the GP to send that notice within 30 to 60 days of the relevant closing, with a comprehensive notice following the final close. Each eligible LP then has to respond in writing, and an election, once made, is usually irrevocable.

Eligibility is tiered, not universal

Not every MFN holder qualifies for every term. Eligibility is almost always tiered by commitment size: an LP with a smaller commitment usually can't elect a term negotiated with a larger investor, only terms extended to LPs at or below its own level. Standard carve-outs shrink the list further — ERISA and tax accommodations, advisory committee seats, transfer rights, and terms tied to being a first-close or anchor investor are typically excluded from MFN eligibility entirely. Building an accurate list of who's owed a notice, and for which terms, is most of the work.

Nothing propagates automatically.

WHO THE FUND OWES A NOTICEA fee term signed with LP 40 ($8M) — eligibility depends on commitment tierCommitmentFee TermsCo-InvestReportingExcuse RightsLP 04$25MLP 12$10MLP 23$6MLP 31$15MLP 40 (new)$8MEligible to electHolds MFN, below commitment tierNew term just signedNotice owed within 30–60 days to every eligible LP, plus standard carve-outs excludedLEDGERby Orivade
Illustrative, not measured — actual MFN thresholds, carve-outs, and notice timing vary by fund and side letter.

The notice itself is a fight

GPs generally prefer to describe a new term categorically — a management fee discount, without the number — since the underlying economics were negotiated privately with someone else. LPs and their counsel routinely push back that a categorical description doesn't give them enough to decide whether electing is worth it. Disputes over how much detail an MFN notice needs are one of the more common sources of side letter conflict, and most funds' governing documents don't settle the question with much precision.

It breaks on time, not on rules

Side letters get negotiated individually, usually under time pressure during a closing, by whoever is handling that specific LP relationship. Each one is correct on its own. None of them, filed individually, produces a correct MFN process — that only happens when someone pulls every relevant term together, fast, against a clock nobody chose. Storage location isn't the problem. The notice depends on relationships between the documents, not where any one of them sits.

The process has to be queryable

The funds that handle this well don't treat the MFN obligation as something to reconstruct after the fact. They treat it as a set of structured terms — this LP, this provision, this commitment tier, this carve-out — queryable the moment a new term is negotiated, so the notice can be assembled correctly and on time instead of built from scratch against a deadline. That's not about predicting every future negotiation — it's about knowing, the moment a new term is offered, exactly who else already has a right to hear about it.

An MFN clause isn't self-executing. It only works if the fund can administer the process behind it. The clause may be one sentence. The process behind it is not.